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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Compared to some of the grand old journals of the legal academy,
the Florida State University Law Review is tender in age. In thirtytwo short years of publication, our readership has grown along with
our reputation. As the academy has come to recognize our contributions to the legal debate, the opportunities for our journal to publish
quality scholarship have increased dramatically in recent years. The
articles that find their way to our Selection Committee have grown
ever more tempting, and our prior format of publishing three general
interest issues and a Legislative Edition has grown ever more confining. This format required the Review to forgo timely general interest
articles in favor of one yearly edition dedicated to Florida issues.
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Though the Legislative Edition was noble in purpose, it imposed the
unnecessary restriction of publishing Florida-specific issues just once
per year. Beginning with Volume 32, the Review will no longer publish the Legislative Edition. To serve our readers by reporting Florida-specific issues in a timely matter, the Review will now publish a
Recent Developments feature that will appear alongside the general
interest articles.
Our vision for the Recent Developments is one that explores and
criticizes cases and developments that we believe our readership will
find interesting. This might be because a case bodes to be seminal in
a particular area of the law; this might be because a case presents
particular public policy opportunities; this might be because a case is
prominent in the public consciousness. Although we will analyze federal cases and Florida legislation, particularly when such cases and
legislation may interest our readers, our primary focus for the Recent
Developments will be the state courts of Florida.
For our first installment of the Recent Developments, we present
cases from both Florida state courts and the federal judiciary.1 The
opening Note examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v.
Washington,2 which, though it replaces a subjective and malleable
Confrontation Clause analysis with a bedrock guarantee, may nonetheless have uncertain and sweeping effects in the realm of criminal
practice. Next, we take a look at the Supreme Court’s latest interpretation of the jurisdictional requirements of the Clean Water Act in
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.3 The last federal opinion we consider is the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Café Erotica v. St. Johns County,4 which provides a new
vehicle for analysis at the intersection of the First Amendment and
local sign ordinances.
Our coverage of the Supreme Court of Florida begins with Haire v.
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,5 which
serves as the latest installment in the ongoing citrus canker saga.
Next, State v. Jones6 examines the tension between a prosecutor try-

1. Danielle Appignani, Chris Hamilton, Shane Ramsey, Michelle Robichaud, Ty
Roofner, Jessica Slatten, and Christian Turner contributed to the inaugural installment of
the Recent Developments.
We would also like to extend our thanks to the professors and practitioners who provided able assistance to our contributors. Professors Rob Atkinson, David Markell, J.B.
Ruhl, Jennifer LaVia, and Gary S. Edinger, Esq., all supplied invaluable guidance in our
analyses. Finally, the Law Review owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to Professor
Charles Ehrhardt for his instrumental role in guiding and assisting the publication of the
first Recent Developments.
2. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
3. 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004).
4. 360 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004).
5. 870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004).
6. 867 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2004).
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ing a defendant and an impermissible comment on the defendant’s
right to remain silent. In Topps v. State,7 the court clarifies the standard for res judicata in Florida courts. Finally, in Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson,8 the Florida Supreme Court invokes the “undertaker’s doctrine” to create a tort duty to the public for utilities
that supply street lighting. It is with pride that we present the Florida State University Law Review’s inaugural Recent Developments.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—CONFRONTATION CLAUSE—REESTABLISHING
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES—UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT OVERTURNS CRIMINAL CONVICTION BECAUSE
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE USED AT TRIAL VIOLATED THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE—Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354
(2004).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . . .”9 Despite this provision, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts,10 the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of the right to confrontation was replaced with a subjective reliability analysis. Under Roberts, lower courts across the country have struggled to determine the circumstances in which particular out-of-court statements should be admitted at trial.11 This doctrine permits a judge to admit an out-of-court statement if it bears
adequate “indicia of reliability.”12 Reliability can be inferred if the
statement falls under a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or contains
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”13 The Roberts Court
elected to allow the common law to develop the definition of these
terms.
Left without guidance as to the actual application of this new test,
the lower courts forged ahead in the search for “reliability” and
“trustworthiness.” Widespread inconsistencies resulted. For instance,
in Virginia, a state court of appeals thought a statement more reliable if the witness was in custody and charged with a crime.14 In direct contrast, a Wisconsin court held that a statement was more reliable if the witness was not in custody and not a suspect.15 Further7. 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004).
8. 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
11. See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
12. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
13. Id.
14. See Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 (Va. App. 2003), abrogated
by Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1354.
15. State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002), abrogated by Crawford,
124 S. Ct. at 1354.
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more, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that if a codefendant voluntarily makes a statement to police, and if the codefendant is free to
leave at any time during the interview, then a statement inculpating
the defendant and the codefendant is admissible against both.16
However, in Oregon, the same statement would be admissible even if
the witness is not free to leave at any time.17
The set of circumstances presented by Crawford further exemplified the difficulty of the Roberts framework. In Crawford, petitioner
Michael Crawford was charged with the attempted murder of a man
who had allegedly attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia.18 Crawford confessed that he went in search of the victim, Kenneth Lee, and ultimately stabbed Lee in the torso during a physical confrontation.19 At
trial, Crawford claimed the stabbing was in self-defense, but though
his hand was cut in the fight, his original statement to police was
ambiguous as to whether he had indeed acted in self-defense.20 Sylvia
witnessed the stabbing and offered the police an equally ambiguous
statement describing the stabbing.21 Nevertheless, at trial, Sylvia’s
tape-recorded statement was introduced as evidence that the stabbing was not in self-defense.22 The statement was admitted over the
petitioner’s objection that it violated the Confrontation Clause, and
the jury subsequently convicted Crawford.23
Relying on the Roberts framework, the trial court admitted the
statement on the ground that the statement bore “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.”24 The Washington Court of Appeals,
employing a nine-factor balancing test, reversed;25 however, the
Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, unanimously

16. People v. Schutte, 613 N.W.2d 370, 375-76 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), abrogated by
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1354.
17. State v. Franco, 950 P.2d 348, 352-53 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
18. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1357.
19. Id.
20. See id. In his trial testimony, Crawford said: “[T]his is just a possibility, but I
think . . . that he pulled something out and I grabbed for it . . . .” Id.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 1358. Sylvia was unavailable to Crawford for cross-examination because of
the state marital privilege, which prohibits one spouse from testifying against another
without the consent of the spouse against whom testimony is offered. Id. at 1357. In a footnote, Scalia reserved the question of whether a defendant waives his right to confront witnesses under the Confrontation Clause by invoking the privilege. Id. at 1359 n.1.
23. Id. at 1358.
24. Id. Among the reasons the trial court found Sylvia’s statement reliable: she was
not shifting blame from herself to Crawford; she was an eyewitness possessing direct
knowledge; she was describing recent events; and the statements were made to a police officer. Id.
25. Id. The court reversed, in part, because Sylvia’s statements to police conflicted
with her prior statements and she admitted she had shut her eyes during the stabbing. Id.
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concluding that the petitioner’s and Sylvia’s statements interlocked
and, thus, were reliable.26
Justice Scalia wrote for the Crawford Court and began his analysis with a lengthy discussion of the history of the Confrontation
Clause.27 Per Scalia, this history supports two inferences about the
Framers’ intended meaning of the Confrontation Clause. First, it
suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Clause or the core concerns of the Sixth Amendment.28 According to Scalia, the chief concern of the Confrontation Clause was witnesses who “bear testimony”
against the accused.29 With this concern in mind, Scalia focused the
Confrontation Clause analysis on a specific type of out-of-court
statement: “testimonial” statements.30 Second, the history of the
Clause supports the notion that “the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”31
After establishing these two principles, Scalia recalled prior case
law and found the Court’s decisions “largely consistent with these
two principles.”32 In past cases, testimonial statements had only been
admitted when the declarant was unavailable and when the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.33 Thus, while the decisions may ultimately have been correct, the rationales employed by
the Court in reaching these results have been far from consistent or
correct. Specifically, Ohio v. Roberts encapsulates the Court’s inconsistencies in dissecting and applying the Confrontation Clause.34 Notably absent from the doctrine adopted by the Court in Roberts is any
mention whatsoever of the textual guarantee of the right to confront
one’s accusers.35 Instead of guiding the lower courts with a clear rule,
the Supreme Court’s formulation charged the lower courts with dis26. Id. While both Sylvia’s and petitioner’s statements indicated that the victim, Lee,
was possibly grabbing for a weapon, the Washington Supreme Court found their statements equally unsure as to when this event took place. They were also equally uncertain
as to how the petitioner received the cut on his hand. In this manner, their statements interlocked. Id.
27. Id. at 1359. Among the historical examples weighing on the Framers’ mind regarding the evils of unconfronted testimony included the 1603 English trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh for treason, where Raleigh’s alleged accomplice made statements against him
which were read to the jury. Id. The jury convicted Raleigh and sentenced him to death
based upon unrebutted testimony. Id. at 1360.
28. Id. at 1364.
29. Id.
30. Id. With this pronouncement, the Court introduced a new term into the vernacular of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. For a discussion of the implications of this new
vocabulary, see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
31. Id. at 1365.
32. Id. at 1367.
33. Id. at 1369.
34. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1354.
35. See id. at 70-75.
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cerning a set of circumstances in which an out-of-court statement
could be deemed “reliable.”36 The Roberts framework perhaps assumed that the lower courts would eventually settle and agree on a
uniform set of criteria that could be consistently applied. Unfortunately, the lower courts struggled in their decisions, failed to achieve
uniformity, and left the Confrontation Clause without a minimum
baseline guarantee.
The Court continued the reliability-based framework of Roberts in
Idaho v. Wright.37 Wright involved the admission of statements of the
defendant’s daughter, the alleged abuse victim, to a pediatrician
while she was in police protective custody.38 In a five-to-four decision,
the Court held that the witness’s statement was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted.39 This decision demonstrates what Scalia proposes in Crawford: the right decision reached by way of the wrong rationale.
In Wright, the Court opined that the witness’s out-of-court statement should be evaluated by consideration of “the totality of the circumstances.”40 Thus, under Roberts, determining the “particularized
guarantee[] of trustworthiness”41 required consideration on a case-bycase basis, in which the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
making of the statement itself was used to determine the overall reliability of an out-of-court witness statement. Such a case-by-case
approach invited the type of inconsistent balancing tests for reliability that the lower courts have utilized. As Scalia observed, “replacing
categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing
tests . . . [does] violence to [the Framers’] design.”42
The Court realized that the Roberts framework was misguided. It
replaced a constitutionally-prescribed method of ensuring reliability
with a subjective judicial determination. As Scalia pointed out, “the
Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”43 Chiefly, it was
this procedural focus that was lost in the Court’s confrontation
analysis over the past several decades. The Confrontation Clause
does not require that evidence in fact be reliable, but rather that “reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible
of cross-examination.”44 With such a pronouncement, there was no

36. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
37. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
38. Id. at 809-10.
39. Id. at 826-27.
40. Id. at 826.
41. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 124
S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
42. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1373.
43. Id. at 1370.
44. Id.
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way to salvage Roberts. The Court rejected the Roberts framework,
and Scalia stamped its death certificate with a particularly poignant
pronouncement: “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”45
While it is certain that the Roberts framework is no longer applicable for testimonial evidence, the Crawford opinion leaves many
open questions. If the Confrontation Clause only governs testimonial
evidence, then perhaps the biggest question is what the Court means
by the word “testimonial.” Justice Scalia did not exhaustively define
the phrase, but he noted that it includes in-court testimony, as well
as affidavits, depositions, custodial examinations, confessions, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross, and statements
made during police interrogations.46
Equally as challenging as defining the scope of the term “testimonial” is defining the scope of the term “nontestimonial.” Justice
Scalia pointed out a few of the hearsay exceptions that are nontestimonial, including business records and statements in furtherance of
a conspiracy.47 In so doing, Scalia referred to age-old exceptions to
the general rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence.48 This reference
seems to parallel that portion of Roberts which admitted evidence falling within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,”49 and indicates that
such exceptions may fall outside of the Crawford analysis altogether.
Once “testimonial” is defined, the Court indicates a general
framework to include such evidence at trial, but the framework’s exact workings are far from clear. If testimonial hearsay is involved,
the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant must have been
available at some time. The opportunity for cross-examination is obviously met when the witness/declarant appears at trial. If a witness/declarant does not appear at trial, the party offering his testimony must show (1) the witness/declarant’s unavailability, and (2)
there was an opportunity to cross-examine the witness/declarant
prior to trial.50 Within this framework, the Court did make clear,
however, that the use of prior testimonial statements is not con-

45. Id. at 1371.
46. See id. at 1364. The inclusion of statements made during police interrogations
could prove to be significant. For instance, a prosecutor may not wish to call an ineffective
witness. These statements could still be heard at trial under the Roberts framework by a
showing of particular trustworthiness. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Crawford indicates not
only that unavailability will have to be proven for such statements to be admitted, but also
that a prior opportunity to cross-examine—which is highly unlikely at the scene of a
crime—must be shown. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364-65.
47. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367.
48. Id.
49. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
50. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365.
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strained at all as long as the declarant appears at trial for crossexamination.51
The Court gave further indication that Roberts has not fully been
discarded. The Court stated that where nontestimonial hearsay is
involved, “it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford
the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does
Roberts.”52 Thus, the lower courts may retain the Roberts framework
to the extent that it is applied to nontestimonial evidence.
In spite of, and because of, the number of uncertainties that remain, Crawford will cast a considerable shadow on criminal trials for
years to come as its ambiguities are explored and its implications are
fully realized.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—CLEAN WATER ACT—UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT A POINT SOURCE NEED NOT BE THE
ORIGINAL SOURCE OF POLLUTION TO SATISFY THE JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT—South Florida Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 124 S. Ct. 1537
(2004).
The Clean Water Act53 was enacted in 1972 with the purpose of
“restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”54 Contained in the Clean Water Act
is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
which is a permitting program for entities to legally discharge pollutants into waters.55 In South Florida Water Management District v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,56 the United States Supreme Court held
that a discharge of a pollutant from a point source under the Clean
Water Act includes point sources that are not the original sources of
the pollutants.57 The Court also vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion and remanded the case to the district court for argument on
whether the water bodies in question were “unitary waters” or
whether they were two separate and discrete entities.58 This decision
might affect not only current NPDES regulations promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency but also the number of permits
that may need to be issued each year under the NPDES permitting
program.59

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1369 n.9.
Id. at 1374.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
Id. § 1251(a).
Id. § 1342(a).
124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004).
Id. at 1543.
Id. at 1545.
See id. at 1544-45.
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The Clean Water Act defines the term “discharge of a pollutant”
as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.”60 Once it is determined that a pollutant is discharging into a
navigable water, the next question is whether the pollutant originates from a point source or a nonpoint source, since the NPDES
program only regulates point sources.61 The way in which courts define these terms determines whether individuals or companies are
subject to the NPDES permitting program; that is, whether they
need to apply for a permit in the first place.
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians (“Tribe”) originally sued in the
Southern District of Florida, alleging that the Clean Water Act’s
NPDES program required the pumping facility, operated by the
South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), to obtain a
permit.62 The pumping facility was the result of an Army Corps of
Engineers (“Corps”) project, South Florida Flood Control, with the
purpose of “flood protection, water conservation, and drainage.”63 At
the end of a canal, C-11, a pump station, S-9, pumped water out of
the canal and into the WCA-3, an undeveloped wetland.64 The water
was prevented from returning to the canal by two levees, which also
acted “artificially to separate the C-11 basin from the WCA-3.”65 Water that collected on the C-11 side contained contaminants, including
phosphorous, from agricultural and residential lands, and when it
was pumped into the WCA-3, it altered the ecosystem of that wetland
and in turn affected the Everglades.66 The question for the courts to
decide was whether this addition of polluted water constituted an
addition of a pollutant from a point source under the Clean Water
Act’s NPDES program, thus requiring a permit.67
The case arrived before the Supreme Court after the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the two water bodies
were distinct and the addition of already-polluted water to a navigable water was a point source, thereby requiring a permit to discharge
from one to the other.68 Writing for an eight-justice majority, Justice
O’Connor held that a point source could include a “conveyance” that

60. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
61. Id. Section 1362(14) defines “point source” as “any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, . . .
from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” Id. § 1362(14).
62. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Fla. Water Mgmt Dist., No. 98-6056-CIV,
1999 WL 33494862, at *1, *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 280
F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002), vacated by 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004).
63. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1540.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1541.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1541-42.
68. Id. at 1542.
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is not the “original source of the pollutant.”69 The SFWMD had argued that a permit under the NPDES program was only needed
when “a pollutant originates from the point source.”70 The Court disagreed, observing that the specific language of the definition of a
point source under § 1362(14) made obvious that a point source need
only convey a pollutant into navigable waters.71 Furthermore, to buttress this interpretation, the Court observed that the NPDES program was designed to regulate entities such as municipal wastewater
treatment plants, which discharge waters polluted by individuals
other than the treatment plants.72 The Court reasoned that the argument offered by SFWMD must be incorrect, because if the pollutant must originate from the particular source that is discharging the
waste or pollutant, then municipal wastewater facilities would also
not be required to obtain a permit.73
Next, the Court addressed the SFWMD’s remaining two arguments. The majority held that, on remand, the parties could argue a
“unitary waters” approach;74 that is, whether a permit is needed to
discharge unaltered water from one navigable water into the same
unitary body of water.75 The Court noted that a decision on this argument would have significant practical effects; mainly, it would not
require the SFWMD to obtain a permit if the C-11 and WCA-3 were
considered unitary waters.76 However, since the argument was not
raised in the lower court proceedings, the Court declined to decide
this issue, leaving the issue open to decision on remand.77 Finally, a
factual dispute remained as to whether the C-11 canal and the WCA3 were discrete water bodies.78 If the two were actually one water
body, then a permit would not be needed because there would be no
addition of a pollutant.79 However, the majority reasoned that there
was not enough factual evidence in the record to determine this is-

69. Id. at 1543.
70. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
71. See id. (noting the definition of point source includes pipes and conduits, which
“do not themselves generate pollution”).
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 1545.
75. Id. at 1543-44.
76. Id. at 1544-45. The SFWMD also argued that rejecting the unitary water approach could wreak havoc upon many state regulatory programs due to the increased
number of permits that would be required under such a ruling. See id. at 1545.
77. Id. at 1545. Justice Scalia disagreed as to the propriety of inviting the parties to
make entirely new arguments upon remand. See id. at 1547 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1545.
79. See id. (“‘[I]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours
it back into the pot, one has not “added” soup or anything else to the pot.’” (quoting Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. New York, 273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir.
2001))).

2004]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

289

sue80 and held that the test used by the district court for determining
the issue was applied “prematurely” at the summary judgment stage,
where there were issues of material fact to be resolved.81
Justice Scalia dissented in part and concurred in part. He joined
the part of the opinion that held a point source was included in the
NPDES program, even if the point source did not add the pollutants
to the discharged water.82 However, Scalia would not have vacated
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and would not have remanded to discuss either the unitary waters issue or the discrete water bodies issue because neither was a part of the question presented on certiorari.83 Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted other problems with the latter parts of the majority opinion. He argued that the SFWMD did not
address the unitary waters approach in the court below; therefore, it
should not be allowed to argue this approach on remand.84 Moreover,
he indicated that the district court was not required on summary
judgment to look at arguments that the parties themselves did not
make.85
The Supreme Court’s decision continues a trend of refining the jurisdictional elements of the NPDES program. By holding that a pollutant does not have to originate from the point source that is discharging the pollutant, the Court has again delineated a more specific definition of an element that must be present in order for a
NPDES permit to be required.86 However, the Court also continued a
pattern of narrowing the scope of the definition of “navigable water.”
When the Court decided United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc.,87 it stated that wetlands could be considered navigable waters if
they are adjacent to and bound up with that water body’s hydrologic
cycle.88 After that case was decided, the Environmental Protection
Agency and Corps began to increase the amounts of permits required
under the Clean Water Act,89 and in the view of some, the Clean Wa80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1547 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Scalia stated that although there may be a factual dispute as to whether,
without the S-9 to pump the water to WCA-3, pollutants would still flow from the C-11 to
WCA-3, that was not argued by the parties in the district court, and therefore the Court
should not require a lower court to speculate as to all the possibilities for denying or granting summary judgment. See id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).
86. See id. at 1543. In other cases, courts have more specifically defined the jurisdictional elements of the NPDES permit program. See, e.g., United States v. Plaza Health
Labs., 3 F.3d 643, 646-47, 649 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a person is not a point source as
defined in the Clean Water Act).
87. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
88. Id. at 130-35.
89. Timothy S. Bishop et al., Counting the Hands on Borden Ranch, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10040, 10040 (2004).
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ter Act became a statute that regulated water and land use instead
of a “law protecting the navigable waters.”90
Subsequently, in 2001, the Court decided Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.91
This case invalidated a Corps rule that allowed the Corps to assert
jurisdiction over waters inhabited by migratory birds by holding that
isolated wetlands are not “navigable waters” under the Clean Water
Act.92 In Solid Waste Agency, the Supreme Court began to reduce
what waters constituted navigable waters under the Clean Water
Act; Miccosukee Tribe is another example of the Court limiting what
waters fall under the definition of “navigable.” The Court, in allowing
for the parties on remand to argue that a unitary waters approach
should be used, or in the alternative that the C-11 canal and WCA-3
are the same navigable water and not two distinct water bodies, is
creating another limitation on the definition of navigable waters for
permitting under the Clean Water Act.
In Miccosukee Tribe, the Court left open the unitary waters question. If separate waters are each navigable, but part of the same system, then transfer of water from one body to another would not constitute an addition of a pollutant because the water is added and
taken from the same water body. If, after remand, the Court considers the issue again and accepts the unitary waters approach, then
certain transfers of pollutants between navigable waters would not
require a permit under the NPDES program. This could affect state
NPDES programs that do require permits for this type of pollutant
discharge at present.93 On the other hand, if the Supreme Court does
not recognize the unitary waters approach, then many facilities, such
as the SFWMD’s facilities, will have to begin to comply with the
NPDES permit standards for discharging pollutants. In the instant
case, this is, of course, contingent on the undecided fact of whether
the two water bodies in question are one water body or two discrete
bodies of water.
Once the Supreme Court makes its ultimate decision with regard
to the unitary waters issue, there will be a significant impact upon
some states’ regulatory regimes. For the time being, though, Miccosukee Tribe has not drastically altered the Clean Water Act permitting landscape, though it does send a strong message about the next
possible refinement to the Clean Water Act’s jurisdictional definitions. Given the Court’s holding that ensures the parties will argue
Id.
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
Id. at 167-69.
See Kenneth J. Warren, Water Quality and Water Quantity Management Collide,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 15, 2004, at 9. Warren stated that certain programs, like the
State of Pennsylvania program, that require permits for situations “where water is diverted from one body of water to another” would not be legal anymore. Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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“unitary waters” on remand, and given the Court’s recent holdings
reducing the scope of the Clean Water Act’s threshold requirements,
the ultimate adoption of a “unitary waters” definition seems to be the
next logical step in the development of the Court’s Clean Water Act
jurisprudence.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIRST AMENDMENT—ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
USES BOTH PRIOR RESTRAINT AND CONTENT-BASED ANALYSES TO
HOLD ST. JOHNS COUNTY SIGN ORDINANCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL—
Café Erotica v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Supreme Court utilizes a prior restraint test to analyze licensing or permitting schemes affecting speech.94 This framework allows courts to address the problems of content-based discrimination
and censorship.95 The Eleventh Circuit has used this model to protect
content-based “speech” relating to the adult entertainment industry.
For example, in Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville,96 the
Eleventh Circuit, using a prior restraint test, held the City of Jacksonville’s procedures for obtaining a zoning exception unconstitutional as applied to adult entertainment establishments.97 Despite
the obvious—that the ordinance was directed at a specific type of
speech—the court rendered its holding without implementing a content-based discrimination analysis.98 Recently, in Café Erotica v. St.
Johns County,99 the Eleventh Circuit again used prior restraint
analysis, but this time also expressly injected a content-based discrimination analysis to invalidate a St. Johns County (“County”) sign
ordinance.100 The court held the sign ordinance operated as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech and discriminated against
political speech by favoring commercial speech.101

94. Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After
Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 906 (2000).
95. Id.
96. 176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999).
97. Id. at 1361 (“[A]n exception [to the zoning ordinance is] the equivalent of a license.
. . . [T]he indispensability of the zoning exception persuades us to treat it like a license as
well.”).
98. The court recognized the interplay of prior restraint and content-based discrimination when it noted that the exceptions process “gives the zoning board discretion to delay
a decision indefinitely or to covertly deny applications for content-sensitive reasons.” Id. at
1363 (emphasis added).
99. 360 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004).
100. The parties challenging the ordinance were associated with the adult entertainment industry. The parties, Café Erotica of Florida, Inc. (“Café Erotica” or “Café”) and Café
Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc. (“We Dare to Bare”), were
both incorporated by Jerry Sullivan. Id. Mr. Sullivan also served as president of each corporation. Id. at 1278 n.2.
101. Id. at 1292.
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The appeal consolidated two cases.102 The first case involved an
adult entertainment establishment, Café Erotica of Florida, Inc.,
(“Café Erotica” or “Café”), located in St. Johns County.103 Café Erotica
was issued citations for, among other things, erecting “political message banners”104 without obtaining a permit.105 The second case,
brought by Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit
94, Inc. (“We Dare to Bare”), involved facial and as-applied challenges with respect to a billboard along Interstate 95.106 We Dare to
Bare argued that the County delayed its billboard-licensing decision
and imposed additional requirements not placed on similar businesses.107 The district courts granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and permanently enjoined enforcement of the ordinance.108
The ordinance required a permit for any sign larger than fifteen
square feet.109 The ordinance categorized signs differently; categories
relevant to the appeal included billboard, on-premise, and special use
signs.110 Billboards could be as large as 378 square feet, or 560 square
feet if adjacent to the interstate.111 The ordinance defined billboards
as off-premise signs over thirty-two square feet and on-premise signs
exceeding 300 square feet used for “advertising.”112 On-premise signs
were limited to 150 square feet, or 300 square feet if adjacent to the
interstate.113 “Political message signs,” which required a permit, were
included in the special use category.114 These were defined as “not
containing a commercial message” and were limited to thirty-two

102. Id. at 1277.
103. Id.
104. Censorship toward the appellees may be implicated when one considers the message of two banners. One read, “Karen Bruner [who issued the citations] is An Incompetent
County Official;” and another read, “James Acosta [Supervisor of Code Enforcement for the
County] is a fat ass Barney Fife. He has cost the county thousands of $ in lost lawsuits for
using selective [e]nforcements.” Id. at 1277 n.1.
105. Id. at 1277.
106. Id. at 1278.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1279. The County had fourteen days to approve or deny an application. Id.
However, if the County required more information, the fourteen-day period did not commence until receipt of the additional information. Id. Any decision was appealable to the
Board of County Commissioners within thirty days of the decision. The Board then had fifteen days to render a decision. Id. at 1280. Finally, the Board’s decision could be appealed
to the circuit court within a thirty-day period. Id. The district court decision indicated that
these requirements could permit the County Administrator to delay the permitting process. Id. at 1283. The County amended this section to provide the County Administrator
thirty days to approve or deny an application. Id.
110. Id. at 1280.
111. Id.
112. Id. “Advertising” encompassed both commercial and political speech. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1281.
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square feet, while commercial billboards and signs could reach 560
square feet.115
The court addressed two facial challenges asserted by appellees:
(1) the ordinance was a content-based restriction favoring commercial over political speech, and (2) the ordinance’s permitting requirements operated as an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech under the test established by the Supreme Court in FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas.116
The court began by illustrating that, for this licensing scheme,
prior restraint analysis provided it with an avenue to address content-based discrimination.117 The court concluded that the licensing
process operated as a prior restraint because, in order for expressive
speech—erecting a billboard—to occur, a permit must be issued.118
Thus, for the permitting process to stand, the County’s decision had
to pass a prior restraint test.119 Two criteria must be satisfied under
this test: (1) the County’s decision must be made within a specific
time period, and (2) government officials must not have “unbridled
discretion.”120
The court hearkened back to Lady J. Lingerie to deconstruct the
first prong into two sub-prongs: (1) the permitting decision must be
prompt, and (2) there must be prompt judicial review.121 The first
sub-prong was fulfilled because the decision was approved or denied
within thirty days.122 Likewise, the second sub-prong was fulfilled because the decision could be appealed in the circuit court within thirty
days.123
The court then rejected the County’s contention that the
“[o]rdinance does not give the County Administrator discretion to reject a sign based on its content because the sign applicant need not
disclose the sign’s message.”124 The court’s concern was that the ordinance contained “no explicit limits on the County Administrator’s

115. Id.
116. Id. at 1279 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990)).
117. Id. at 1282 (“We start with prior restraint analysis because our holding in this
section highlights the potential for content-based decisionmaking . . . .”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1283 (citing Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358,
1362-63 (11th Cir. 1999)).
122. Id. The thirty-day period amended the fourteen-day approval period which could
be restarted by the County requesting more information. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1284. Censorship is again implicated because the County, while not knowing what the message was, would know who was applying for the permit. During oral argument, Judge Wilson made this precise point. Telephone Interview with Gary S. Edinger,
Esq., Counsel for Café Erotica and We Dare to Bare (May 14, 2004).
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discretion.”125 Thus, without specific criteria to guide the Administrator, the permitting process was facially unconstitutional.126
The court then addressed whether treating commercial and political billboards in a different manner constituted unconstitutional content-based discrimination. Billboard regulations are controlled by
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.127 Under Metromedia, the first
issue was whether the ordinance was a valid, content-neutral time,
place and manner restriction.128 If the regulation was not based on
the content of the speech, was narrowly tailored to serve a “significant” government interest, and allowed alternative channels to communicate the information, it would be deemed constitutional.129 However, if the regulation was content-based, the County had to demonstrate that the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve a “compelling” governmental interest.130 Consistent with Metromedia, the court
found the regulation was content-based because it discriminated in
favor of commercial messages over political messages.131 The inquiry
then became whether the ordinance “in fact” favored commercial
messages over political messages.132
The County argued that the ordinance did not favor commercial
speech because “any speech, including political messages, can be
placed on billboards.”133 The court rejected this argument, giving four
reasons.134 First, the County’s position ignored that “political message signs” were limited to thirty-two square feet—if commercial and
political messages were intended to be on “equal footing,” the signs
would not be regulated separately.135 Second, “political message
signs” were limited to thirty-two square feet—there was no exception
for “political message billboards.”136 Therefore, political messages
could not enjoy the same 378-square-foot allowance that commercial
billboards were permitted.137 Third, the ordinance required all billboards to display the owner’s name. The court held that this requirement may make sense for commercial messages; however, it
would require “a sign displaying the message ‘Vote for John Smith’
[to also] include the words ‘Café Erotica / We Dare to Bare / Adult

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Café Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1284.
Id.
453 U.S. 490 (1981).
Café Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1285.
Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1287-89.
Id. at 1287-88.
Id. at 1288.
Id.
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Toys / Great Food / Exit 94, Inc.’ in similar bold print.”138 This was inconsistent with a Supreme Court decision holding that “‘an author’s
decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment.’”139 Finally, the County Administrator had the unbridled power to discriminate between political and
commercial messages because the Administrator could limit messages the County disagrees with to thirty-two feet by labeling the
message “political.”140 Conversely, the Administrator could allow
other “political messages” the County agrees with to be placed on
billboards by labeling the message “commercial.”141
Once the court determined that the ordinance “in fact” discriminated based on content, it turned to Metromedia to determine
whether the regulations could pass strict scrutiny by illustrating reasons narrowly tailored to further compelling government interests.142
The Metromedia Court struck down a portion of a San Diego ordinance that prevented certain billboards from displaying political
messages.143 The ordinance allowed on-site commercial billboards,
but almost completely banned similar noncommercial signs.144 The
Café Erotica court found the same preference within the County’s ordinance “in the form of greater size restrictions for noncommercial
messages vis-à-vis commercial ones” and held that the ordinance
must be held facially unconstitutional unless it could satisfy strict
scrutiny, which could be accomplished by enunciating reasons the
ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.145
The County’s reasons were “to protect the safety and aesthetic interests of its citizens.”146 The court agreed that the goals were substantial and that limiting the size of all signs might be justified, but
allowing commercial billboards to reach 560 square feet and political
message signs to reach a maximum of only thirty-two feet could
not.147 The ordinance contained no findings of fact illustrating how
political message signs are more hazardous or more visually displeasing than commercial signs.148 The court held “[t]he County can
achieve its goals simply by mandating that all messages, whether political or commercial, be limited to the same size.”149
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995)).
Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1289.
Id.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
Id. at 512.
Café Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1291.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1292.
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In short, the court found that the ordinance lacked specific guidelines to limit the County Administrator’s discretion and that the ordinance unconstitutionally favored commercial messages over political messages.150 Thus, the ordinance was facially unconstitutional,
making the issue of whether the ordinance was unconstitutional as
applied to the appellees unnecessary to decide.151
Judge Kravitch, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
with the legal framework implemented by the court but disagreed
with its application to the facts.152 Judge Kravitch agreed that the
County impermissibly distinguished between commercial and noncommercial speech, but disagreed that this presented a prior restraint issue.153 He argued that the criteria, regulating the number,
size, and construction of signs, were sufficient and that the court had
held similar regulations permissible.154 Finally, Judge Kravitch argued that “[t]he most natural reading of the ordinance” was contrary
to the majority’s interpretation—he interpreted the ordinance as allowing billboards up to 560 square feet to contain political or commercial messages.155
Café Erotica is consistent with the law of other jurisdictions that
have used prior restraint analysis to provide a tool for addressing
content-based discrimination.156 The facts of this case gave the court
the opportunity not only to “highlight” the potential for contentbased decisionmaking, but also to specifically initiate and apply a
content inquiry. Recently, the court denied the County’s petition for
en banc review. The County could petition the Supreme Court; however, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding does not seem to depart from
other jurisdictions adjudicating prior restraint and content-based
cases. The County is again in the process of amending its ordinance.
Only time will tell if the County implements criteria limiting the
County Administrator’s discretion and utilizes other methods—less
obvious than expressly differentiating between commercial and political messages—to discriminate against content-based speech. For

150. Id.
151. Id. at 1293.
152. Id. (Kravitch, J., concurring and dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1293-94; see also Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 348 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
155. Café Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1295.
156. See Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 890-93 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding a licensing scheme for sexually oriented businesses lacked procedural safeguards and
operated as a prior restraint); Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 110102 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating where all bookstores were required to obtain a permit before operating, the permitting process operated as a prior restraint without prompt judicial review); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1214-17 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding a licensing
provision for sexually oriented businesses gave city officials unbridled discretion to impose
a prior restraint on free speech).
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now, Café Erotica and We Dare to Bare enjoy the protection of a permanent injunction against enforcement of the unconstitutional ordinance.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DUE PROCESS—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
HOLDS THAT DESTRUCTION OF CITRUS TREES PURSUANT TO THE
CITRUS CANKER LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS—Haire v.
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 870 So.
2d 774 (Fla. 2004).
Recently, in Haire v. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,157 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s Citrus Canker Law.158 This Note briefly explains
citrus canker and Florida’s Citrus Canker Law, then discusses the
court’s application of precedent and the Citrus Canker Law to the
facts of Haire, and concludes with a brief discussion of one implication of the court’s decision.
Citrus canker is a bacterial disease that causes significant damage to the leaves, stems, and fruits of citrus trees.159 Unlike other
diseases that damage Florida’s citrus crop,160 citrus canker is readily
transferred from tree to tree via wind-driven rain and contaminated
equipment and plant material.161 Because of its high transferability
rate, scientists estimate that, if left unabated, citrus canker would
decimate Florida’s fresh citrus industry and possibly lead to a federal
ban on Florida’s citrus crop.162 Thus, since its discovery in 1914,163 efforts have been made to eradicate citrus canker.
One such effort is Florida’s Citrus Canker Law, which authorizes
the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (“Department”) to remove and destroy trees infected with and exposed to citrus canker.164 The Department may obtain a search warrant165 for
property that it has probable cause to believe harbors trees infected
with citrus canker and issue an immediate and final order (“IFO”)
requiring all infected and exposed trees discovered on the property to
be removed and destroyed within ten days of the property owner’s re-

157. 870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004).
158. FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2003).
159. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 778.
160. “Spreading decline” is one example of a slow-spreading disease that damages citrus trees. Id. at 784.
161. Id. at 778.
162. See Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So. 2d
539, 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
163. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 778.
164. FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2003).
165. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 788-89 (clarifying that a single search warrant may be issued
for multiple properties where the Department has probable cause to search each property
and describes each property with particularity in its application for a search warrant).
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ceipt of the IFO.166 Additionally, the Florida Legislature has enacted
a compensation scheme167 to reimburse owners whose trees are destroyed pursuant to the Citrus Canker Law. The petitioners in Haire
challenged the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s ruling that neither
the compensation scheme nor the summary destruction of trees provided by the Citrus Canker Law violates due process.168
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the Fourth District’s decision.169 Writing for the majority,170 Justice Pariente emphasized the
state’s ability to deprive citizens of private property via regulation,
such as the Citrus Canker Law, pursuant to its police power,171 and
the court subdivided the due process concerns raised by the petitioners as a result of the state’s destruction of their property into substantive172 and procedural173 due process inquiries. This Note discusses the court’s analysis of substantive due process first, then follows with a discussion of the court’s analysis of procedural due process.
The court held that the “reasonable relationship” test was the
proper standard of review for determining whether the Citrus Canker Law violated substantive due process.174 Relying on precedent,
the court reasoned that the Citrus Canker Law is rationally related
to the Legislature’s legitimate goal of eradicating citrus canker because it provides a method for preventing further spread of the disease.175

166. FLA. STAT. § 581.184(2)(a).
167. Id. § 581.1845.
168. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 777-78. The petitioners also challenged the Fourth District
Court of Appeal’s decision that a single search warrant can provide for the search of multiple properties and that the search warrant can be electronically signed. Id.
169. Id. at 790. The court also upheld the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s ruling that
a single search warrant can include multiple properties where probable cause exists to
search each property and each property is described with particularity. Id. at 788-89. Additionally, the court upheld the Fourth District’s ruling that search warrants could be signed
electronically. Id. at 789-90. However, the Court did not address the Fourth District’s determination that section 933.07(2), Florida Statutes, which permits county-wide searches,
is unconstitutional because that ruling was not appealed. Id. at 777-78.
170. Justices Wells and Bell concurred in the result only. Id. at 790.
171. Id. at 781.
172. “Substantive due process protects ‘the full panoply of individual rights from unwarranted encroachment by the government.’” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Law Enforcement v.
Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1991)).
173. “‘Procedural due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment through
proper administration of justice where substantive rights are at issue.’” Id. at 787 (quoting
Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 960).
174. Id. at 782.
175. The court cited Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Mid-Florida
Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1988), and Johnson v. State ex rel. Maxcy, 128 So. 853
(1930), to support its holding that eradication of citrus canker is a legitimate legislative
goal and destruction of exposed trees is rationally related to this goal. Haire, 870 So. 2d at
783.
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Furthermore, the court rejected the petitioners’ argument that
section 581.1845, Florida Statutes, prevents property owners from
obtaining just compensation for destroyed trees.176 The court noted
that it is the judiciary’s role to determine what constitutes just compensation, and the Legislature cannot enact a statute that sets the
maximum amount of compensation a property owner can receive.177
However, the court distinguished the statute at issue in Haire from a
previous statute that unconstitutionally set the maximum amount of
compensation a property owner could receive178 and held that the
compensation scheme at issue in Haire merely sets a compensation
floor that establishes the minimum amount of compensation an
owner can receive.179 Thus, the court held that the Citrus Canker
Law allows for just compensation because it does not preclude a
property owner from petitioning the courts for compensation in excess of that provided by the statute.180
In addition to finding that the Citrus Canker Law does not violate
substantive due process, the court held that the summary destruction of trees following an IFO by the Department is not a violation of
procedural due process.181 In so deciding, the court distinguished the
facts of Haire from its previous decision in State Plant Board v.
Smith,182 where the court held that summary destruction of trees infected with spreading decline183 was a violation of procedural due
process, because that disease did not pose an imminent danger of
spread.184 Conversely, the court noted the imminent danger of spread
inherent in citrus canker and held that, despite the petitioners’ claim
that summary destruction precludes an opportunity to be heard, the
high transferability rate of citrus canker necessitates summary destruction; therefore, the Citrus Canker Law does not violate procedural due process.185
While courts have historically supported a legislature’s use of its
police power to serve the needs of the many at the expense of the
needs of the few,186 the legislature’s method for compensating prop-

176. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 785.
177. Id.
178. See State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 406-07 (Fla. 1959) (holding unconstitutional a statute that mandated that compensation for destroyed trees not exceed $1000
per acre).
179. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 785.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 787-88.
182. 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959).
183. Id. at 409; see also supra note 160.
184. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 787-88.
185. Id. at 788.
186. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (stating one of the distinguishing characteristics of the police power is the preference of the public interest “over the
property interest of the individual”).
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erty owners who suffer the loss of their trees pursuant to Florida’s
Citrus Canker Law may seem, at first glance, to violate due process
by precluding just compensation. However, the court’s decision in
Haire provides reassurance for property owners whose trees are destroyed in the effort to eradicate citrus canker that the judiciary has
the final word as to what constitutes just compensation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT—FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT A PROSECUTOR’S COMMENTS MUST BE
EVALUATED WITHIN THE ENTIRE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE COMMENTS
ARE MADE—State v. Jones, 867 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2004).
A defendant has the constitutional right to decline to testify
against himself in a criminal proceeding.187 This right has been expanded to incorporate not only the right to refuse to testify but also
the right to prevent a prosecutor from making any improper comment regarding the defendant’s failure to testify.188 However, it is not
always clear when this right has been violated, and the Florida
courts have been left with the difficult task of determining when the
prosecutor has crossed the line. The test for determining whether a
comment is improper is whether the comment is “fairly susceptible of
being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the defendant’s failure
to testify.”189 Recently, the Florida Supreme Court addressed this issue in State v. Jones190 and expanded the test to require that the
questionable statement be evaluated in the context in which it was
made and not as an isolated comment.191
Determining whether a statement is “fairly susceptible of being
interpreted by the jury as a comment on the defendant’s failure to
testify” is not an easy task, and Florida courts have struggled with
trying to draw the fine line between permissible and impermissible
comments. The question often turns on whether the prosecutor intended for the comment to be directed at the defendant’s failure to
testify or whether there was another plausible explanation for the
statement.192 However, comments may be interpreted differently depending on whether they are evaluated as isolated comments or
whether the entire context in which the comment was made is taken
into consideration.193
187. The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Florida Constitution
guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness
against oneself.” FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
188. See Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 655, 660 (Fla. 2003).
189. Miller v. State, 847 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
190. 867 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2004).
191. Id. at 400.
192. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 438 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1983).
193. See Jones, 867 So. 2d at 400.
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The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Jones put an end
to the inconsistency among the lower courts by creating a rule that a
prosecutor’s comment is to be examined within the entire context in
which it was made.194 In the case, Allister Jones was charged with
the lewd assault upon, and false imprisonment of, a child under the
age of thirteen.195 During his trial, the prosecutor made the following
comment during the closing argument:
The State of Florida has proven this case beyond a reasonable
doubt and I ask you to go back in that jury room, apply your common sense to the true facts of this case and come back and tell the
defendant what he knows sitting there today, that he is guilty of
indecent assault.196

Jones objected to the prosecutor’s remark, “what the defendant
knows sitting there today,” as being an improper comment on his refusal to testify.197 The trial court overruled the objection; the jury
found Jones guilty and sentenced him to a fifteen-year imprisonment.198
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed this decision and
found that the prosecutor’s remarks violated Jones’s right to remain
silent.199 The court held that “[b]y both referring to him as ‘sitting
there’ and instructing the jury to ‘tell him what he already knows,’
the state suggested that Jones did not testify because he knew he
was guilty.”200
In its decision, the Fourth District rejected the suggestion that the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. State was controlling
authority and instead distinguished the case based upon its facts.201
In Harris, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder, burglary with an assault, and robbery.202 During the trial, the officers
who had interrogated Harris were called as witnesses and offered
testimony that, during his interrogation, Harris was calm and had
denied his involvement in the crimes, and it was not until several
hours later that Harris confessed.203 The prosecutor made the following statement in his closing argument: “I submit to you this was a
voluntary statement taken after a considerable period of time in
which he sat there and remained the same immobile, unemotional
194. Id.
195. Id. at 399.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Jones v. State, 821 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), quashed by 867 So. 2d 398
(Fla. 2004).
200. Id. at 474.
201. Id.
202. Harris v. State, 438 So. 2d 787, 789 (Fla. 1983).
203. Id. at 790.
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self as he has this entire trial.”204 The Florida Supreme Court held
that when the comment was considered within the context of the entire closing argument, “[i]t is obvious that the prosecutor was describing to the jury the appellant’s demeanor during his interrogation by comparing it to appellant’s demeanor as he appeared before
them at the trial.”205
The Fourth District found the instant comment distinguishable
from the comment in Harris because, in Jones, “the prosecutor was
referring to what Jones[] knew as he was ‘sitting there,’ i.e., at trial,
and not how he may have acted, or what he may have said, at another time.”206 The Fourth District found the “comment certainly was
‘fairly susceptible’ of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on
Jones’s exercise of his right to remain silent.”207
Judge May dissented and stated in his opinion that the majority
was incorrect in its finding that the statement in Harris was distinguishable because it “focused on the defendant’s demeanor at the
time of the confession” and not on the defendant’s demeanor during
the trial.208 Judge May argued that this was not a proper basis to
draw a distinction; there was no difference between a comment focused on the defendant’s demeanor at the time of the trial and a
comment focused on the defendant’s demeanor at the time of the confession.209 According to Judge May, both comments should be evaluated in the same manner.210
The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the Fourth District
and its interpretation of the holding in Harris.211 The Court held that
whether a comment is proper or improper does not depend on
whether the remark focuses on the defendant’s demeanor at the time
of his confession and not his demeanor during the trial; rather, Harris requires the courts to evaluate comments within the entire context of the argument and not as isolated comments.212 By isolating
the comment, the Fourth District could not appreciate the significance of the comment.213 When the controversial phrase in Jones is
read within the context of the entire argument, “it is clear that the
statement amounts to nothing more than a point of reference.”214

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 794.
Id. at 795.
Jones, 821 So. 2d at 475.
Id.
Id. at 476 (May, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
State v. Jones, 867 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. 2004).
Id.
See id.
Id.
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In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court evaluated Florida cases
in which the closing remarks were found to have violated the defendant’s right to remain silent.215 In its analysis of these cases, the
court noted that the comments all referred to the respondent “sitting
there” during the entire trial, whereas the comment in State v. Jones
merely referred to the defendant “sitting there” as the prosecutor
made his closing argument.216 In conclusion, the Florida Supreme
Court found that the comment was not an improper comment on
Jones’s exercise of his right to remain silent but rather was simply a
reference to Jones’s physical position in the courtroom.217
Justice Wells wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing with Justice
May’s dissent in the Fourth District’s decision that there was no distinction between the comment made in Harris and the one made in
Jones.218 Chief Justice Anstead dissented from the majority opinion
and argued that Harris was distinguishable because the prosecutor’s
objective in making the statement was different in each of these
cases.219 Because the cases were both factually specific, Chief Justice
Anstead stated that “we will add little to the law by providing another layer of review. The majority opinion is not announcing a broad
rule of law, but instead has us serving as a second appellate court,
which is not the function of this Court.”220
The decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Jones requires courts to look at the entire context of the questionable comment, looking beyond the comment’s text. This rule calls for a new
analysis from courts that previously evaluated the comments on
their own, rather than within a larger context. Ideally, this requirement will lead to more accurate determinations of whether the comment was focused on the defendant’s failure to testify or was actually
being offered for another purpose by providing a broader view of
what exactly the prosecutor was trying to get across to the jury.
However, this decision leaves several questions unanswered.
First, the court does not describe what constitutes the entire context;
that is, how much of the prosecutor’s testimony the court should review, and who determines which parts of the trial are relevant as the
“context” of the statement. Second, the court also glosses over the
distinction between comments directed at a defendant “sitting there”
at the time of the comment and those describing the defendant “sitting there” throughout the trial.221 The court suggests that if the
prosecutor refers to the defendant as “sitting there” during the entire
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 401 (Wells, J., concurring).
Id. at 402 (Anstead, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 400.
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trial, then this is a violation of the defendant’s right to remain silent.222 However, if the prosecutor simply refers to the defendant’s
presence as “sitting there” during the prosecutor’s comment, then
this is a point of reference and not an attack on the defendant’s
choice not to testify.223 The court does not state directly whether
there is a distinction, but nonetheless, a distinction can be inferred
from the context of the opinion; at this time, it is unclear if the court
intended to make this distinction.
CIVIL PROCEDURE—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT
UNELABORATED ORDERS DENYING RELIEF IN CONNECTION WITH AN
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT PETITION ARE NOT DECISIONS ON THE MERITS
WHICH WOULD LATER BAR THE LITIGANT FROM PRESENTING THE
ISSUE UNDER THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL—Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004).
Florida courts have consistently held that for an action to be
barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel,224 the decision must
have been made “on the merits.”225 However, until the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision in Topps v. State, Florida case law was
in conflict with respect to whether an unelaborated order denying relief of an extraordinary writ226 petition was to be considered a decision on the merits.227
In the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, an unelaborated denial of a petition for a writ of prohibition was not considered a ruling on the merits.228 Conversely, the Third and Fourth
District Courts of Appeal held that an unelaborated order denying a
petition for a writ of prohibition was to be regarded as a ruling on the
merits.229

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are related but different concepts. See discussion infra notes 240-48 and accompanying text.
225. See Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004).
226. An extraordinary writ is one which is “issued by a court exercising unusual or discretionary power.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1602 (7th ed. 1999). Examples include writs
of certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition. Id.
227. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1256.
228. See Smith v. State, 738 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Sumner v. Sumner, 707
So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State Dep’t of Envtl. Reg. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing
Dist., 424 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
229. See Hobbs v. State, 689 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), overruled by Topps v.
State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004); Obanion v. State, 496 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986),
overruled by Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004). The Third and Fourth Districts
did not, however, consider all unelaborated denials of extraordinary writ petitions to be decisions on the merits. For instance, in Hobbs the court differentiated between a petition for
certiorari and a petition for prohibition:
[D]enying certiorari without opinion is not the same as denying prohibition
without opinion.
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The Florida Supreme Court first attempted to address this conflict
in 1998 by proposing an amendment to Rule 9.100 of the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure.230 Under the proposed amendment, an
unelaborated denial would have been deemed a decision on the merits.231 However, the Florida Bar’s Appellate Court Rules Committee
reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s proposal and submitted the
court with an amendment that would not consider an unelaborated
denial of an extraordinary writ petition to be a decision on the merits.232 At that time the court rejected the committee’s proposal, determining that the better approach would be to wait until the proper
case was before them in order to remedy the lack of uniformity.233
Topps presented the court with the appropriate case to address the
problem.
In June of 2001, Martha Topps filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Florida Supreme Court challenging the Stop Turning
Out Prisoners Act, which required inmates to serve eighty-five percent of their sentences in prison.234 The Act limited the amount of
gain time that could be used by an inmate to reduce the amount of
time that they actually spent in prison.235 Topps alleged that the Legislature should not have been permitted to accomplish this by passing a law, but rather should have utilized the mechanism of a constitutional amendment.236 The Florida Supreme Court considered
Topps’ arguments and found them to be without merit.237 However,
the court denied the petition by issuing an unelaborated order denying relief.238 Topps subsequently filed another petition for a writ of
mandamus asserting the same issue.239

On a petition for certiorari, no matter how clear the error of a trial judge may
be, we do not have jurisdiction so long as the petitioner has an adequate remedy on appeal. The vast majority of petitions for certiorari are dismissed because there is an adequate remedy on appeal. There is no similar jurisdictional
hurdle, separate and apart from the propriety of the action of the trial court,
when an appellate court reviews a petition for writ of prohibition.
Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1250 (footnote omitted).
230. Topps, 856 So. 2d at 1256. Rule 9.100 establishes the procedures for processing
writ petitions filed in appellate courts. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. In 1999 the court declined to adopt its proposed amendments to Rule 9.100. Id.
at 1257 n.4.
234. Id. at 1254.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The Florida Supreme Court subsequently addressed the Stop Turning Prisoners Out Act in Comer v. Moore “and held that it did not violate the single subject requirement of Florida’s Constitution.” Id. at 1254 n.1 (citing Comer v. Moore, 817 So. 2d 784 (Fla.
2002)).
239. Id.
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The issue before the court was whether the denial of Topps’ prior
petition acted as a procedural bar to the current action. More specifically, the court addressed whether Topps’ subsequent petition was
barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are related but different concepts.240 Res judicata is a
doctrine that bars relitigation in a subsequent cause of action for
claims that were raised and claims that could have been raised.241 In
Florida, “res judicata applies when four identities are present: (1)
identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3)
identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the
quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.”242 The
doctrine of collateral estoppel in Florida “bars relitigation of the
same issues between the same parties in connection with a different
cause of action.”243 For these two doctrines to have effect, the ruling
must have been made on the merits.244 The court noted that in most
cases where it denied an extraordinary writ petition on the merits it
indicated so in the order by stating the denial is “on the merits” or
“with prejudice,” or “without prejudice.”245 The petition in Topps’ previous case was denied without such an indication.246 However, the

240. Professors Wright and Kane have said the following regarding the common practice of using res judicata to refer to all doctrines in which one judgment will have binding
effect on another:
“Res Judicata” has been used . . . as a general term referring to all of the ways
in which one judgment will have a binding effect on another. That usage is and
doubtless will continue to be common, but it lumps under a single name two
quite different effects of judgments. The first is the effect of foreclosing any litigation of matters that never have been litigated, because of the determination
that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit. The second is the effect
of foreclosing relitigation of matters that have once been litigated and decided.
The first of these, preclusion of matters that were never litigated, has gone under the name, “true res judicata,” or the names, “merger” and “bar.” The second
doctrine, preclusion of matters that have once been decided, has usually been
called “collateral estoppel.” [Some commentators have] long argued for [the] use
of the names “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion” for these two doctrines,
and this usage is increasingly employed by the courts as it is by Restatement
Second of Judgments.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 100A, at 726 (6th
ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted).
241. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1255. Res judicata translated from Latin means “a thing adjudicated.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (7th ed. 1999).
242. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1255.
243. Id. For another explanation, see Gordon v. Gordon:
[T]he principle of estoppel by judgment is applicable where the two causes of
action are different, in which case the judgment in the first suit only estops the
parties from litigating in the second suit issues—that is to say points and questions—common to both causes of action and which were actually adjudicated in
the prior litigation.
59 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 1952).
244. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1255.
245. Id. at 1257.
246. Id.
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court stated that in that case it intended the denial to be on the merits.247 Because Topps’ original petition was denied on the merits and
because the four identities were present between the original petition
and the current petition, the court held that Topps’ claim was barred
by res judicata.248
In making the distinction between the unelaborated denial and
the elaborated denial, the court sought to resolve the conflict between
the district courts of appeal in Florida. The court noted that extraordinary writs can be denied for numerous reasons, some of which are
not based on the merits of the petition.249 Because extraordinary writ
petitions can be denied based on things other than the merits of the
case, the court held that only elaborated denials indicating that the
decision was made on the merits could have res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect.250 Elaborating on this new requirement, the court
opined:
When a court intends to deny an extraordinary writ petition on the
merits, the court need only include in its order a simple phrase
such as “with prejudice” or “on the merits” to indicate that the
merits of the case have been considered and determined and that
the denial is on the merits.251

The court’s decision may have come as a surprise based upon previous actions of the court. For instance, the court’s approach in Topps
was a reversal of the approach it recommended in 1998 with its proposed amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100.252
Furthermore, in Barwick v. State,253 the court specifically approved of
the Third District’s practice of considering unelaborated denials as
decisions on the merits.254 In Topps, the court receded from its approval of the Third District’s approach by adopting a different approach, stating that for a denial to be on the merits it must be accompanied with a statement such as “with prejudice.”255
The court’s decision to recede from a portion of its earlier decision
was based on a desire for uniformity between the district courts of
Appeal and a concern that substantive rights of litigants be pro-

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. “Relief may not be granted for a number of reasons: the relief sought is either
premature or moot, or the appellate court may deem it more appropriate to review the allegations on direct appeal later.” Id. at 1257 n.5.
250. Id. at 1258. The court’s holding operates prospectively so as not to burden the
lower courts with the task of reviewing previous unelaborated denials. Id.
251. Id. The court was clear that this new requirement “does not require the lower tribunals to issue an opinion in every writ case.” Id.
252. See id. at 1256.
253. 660 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1995), modified by Topps, 865 So. 2d 1258 n.6.
254. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1258 n.6.
255. Id.
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tected.256 The court’s decision was clearly the correct one. To bar a
litigant from possible relief at a later date based on an unelaborated
denial—a denial that may not have been decided on the merits of the
case—is a great injustice. As the Topps court noted, “the idea underlying res judicata is that if a matter has already been decided, the
petitioner has already had his or her day in court, and for purposes of
judicial economy, that matter generally will not be reexamined again
in any court.”257 The theory behind res judicata is not, however, to
prevent a petitioner from his or her day in court based on a procedural technicality such as the action being dismissed on ripeness or
mootness grounds. The Topps decision eliminates this harsh possibility and provides a uniform approach for the Florida courts.
TORTS—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT INVOKES THE “UNDERTAKER’S
DOCTRINE” TO CREATE A TORT DUTY TO THE PUBLIC FOR ENTITIES
RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING STREETLIGHTS—Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003).
The threshold question in a negligence claim is whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty.258 Without a duty, a defendant is
not obligated to act reasonably towards a plaintiff.259 As a “no duty”
ruling effects a blanket denial of access to the courts, it is argued
that a court should not dismiss a claim for want of duty unless circumstances clearly warrant the application of a general no-duty rule
and the particular facts of the claim could not change the outcome.260
If protecting plaintiffs’ access to the courts is the policy objective behind the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson,261 it succeeds to that end; however, in so ruling,
the court departs from over seventy-five years of relatively clear
precedent whereby a utility owes no tort duty to the public resulting
from a public contract to supply a service.262 Further, the court’s basis for implying a common law duty—the “undertaker’s doctrine,”263—
creates odd incentives for utilities in the position of providing services to the public. Namely, the court provides an impetus for utilities,264 which are capable of maintaining streetlights, to not enter the
256. Id. at 1258.
257. Id. at 1255 (emphasis in original).
258. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (W.
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
259. Id.
260. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 227 (2001).
261. 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003).
262. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (1928); see also
Arenado v. Fla Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
263. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1186.
264. This Note will refer to both utilities and municipalities as “utilities,” as the consequences of Clay Electric are similar for utilities and all other governmental entities capable
of supplying and maintaining street lighting. See id. at 1205 (Cantero, J., dissenting)
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streetlight-maintenance business altogether rather than face the
costs and risks of litigation stemming from negligence claims by
members of the public.265
In the predawn hours of September 4, 1997, Dante Johnson, a
fourteen-year-old walking to his school bus stop, was struck and
killed by a truck.266 The accident occurred in an area where a streetlight had malfunctioned; Clay Electric Cooperative (“Clay Electric”)
had previously entered into a contract with the Jacksonville Electric
Authority (JEA) assuming the responsibility of maintaining the
streetlights along the street where the accident occurred.267 Johnson’s
grandmother and Johnson’s estate each filed negligence actions
against Clay Electric,268 alleging that Clay Electric had improperly
maintained the streetlight, and that if the streetlight had functioned
properly, the truck driver would have seen Johnson and avoided the
collision.269
Clay Electric moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted after drawing all reasonable inferences against Clay Electric, including: the driver of the truck was not negligent and if the
streetlight had functioned, the accident would not have occurred.270
The trial court concluded that Clay Electric’s contractual duty to the
JEA to maintain the streetlight did not equate to a tort duty to Johnson. The First District Court of Appeal reversed,271 and the Florida
Supreme Court granted review based upon a conflict between the
First and Third District Courts of Appeal.272
Justice Shaw, writing for a five-justice majority, concluded that
the trial court erred in dismissing Johnson’s claim for want of duty.
Rather than applying the reasoning of Justice Cardozo in such cases,
the supreme court forged its own path.273 To establish duty, the court
(“[M]unicipalities and utilities will ponder carefully before installing any new streetlights
. . . .”).
265. See infra notes 289–92 and accompanying text.
266. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1184.
267. Id. The JEA had installed the streetlights several years before the accident; the
JEA and Clay Electric are each utilities. Id.
268. The cases were consolidated at trial. Id.
269. Id. The plaintiffs also named the truck driver and the truck owner as defendants.
Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1184-85. The decedent and the grandmother appealed the motion, the truck
owner filed a separate appeal, and the cases were consolidated before the supreme court.
Id. at 1185.
272. Id. In Martinez v. Florida Power & Light Co., the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of a utility responsible for maintaining a streetlight, holding that a contract
to maintain streetlights did not create a common law tort duty. 785 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla.
3d DCA 2001), quashed by 863 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 2003).
273. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1188-89. In H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., the
defendant utility, contractually obligated to supply water to the City of Rensselaer, failed
to provide adequate water pressure to a fire hydrant. 159 N.E. 896, 896-97 (1928). A building caught fire, but the lack of water pressure caused the building to suffer a total loss. Id.
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invoked the undertaker’s doctrine, which requires one who goes forward providing a service to act carefully and not place others in
harm’s way.274 Duty under the doctrine is broader than merely for
parties in privity—an undertaking may create a duty to third parties.275 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts,276 the court concluded that Clay Electric should have foreseen its inoperative streetlights could increase the risk of harm to third parties using the
streets.277 The court analyzed “increased risk” as whether the negligent maintenance creates increased risk as compared to if the maintenance had occurred, rather than whether negligent maintenance
creates increased risk as compared to if the undertaken service had
not been provided at all.278

The building’s owners filed a negligence action, but the New York Court of Appeals held
that the utility’s contract with the city to maintain water pressure did not create a duty to
the public allowing negligence actions against the utility when the utility breached the
contract. Id. at 897. H.R. Moch is regarded as the seminal case for the duty of a public utility company. See Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1196-98 (Cantero, J., dissenting); see also
Arenado v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Nonetheless,
the majority elected not to follow H.R. Moch, as it was decided when the undertaker’s doctrine was “ill-defined” and the New York court did not have the benefit of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to guide its analysis. Id. at 1188.
274. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1186.
275. Id. Contra Nicole Rosenkrantz, Note, The Parent Trap: Using the Good Samaritan
Doctrine to Hold Parent Corporations Directly Liable for Their Negligence, 37 B.C. L. REV.
1061, 1063 (1996) (“Although the existence of a special relationship is not explicitly mandated by [Restatement (Second) of Torts] section 324A, plaintiffs were rarely successful in
asserting [section 324A] claims absent a showing that such a special relationship existed.”).
276. The Restatement (Second) provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
....
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person
upon the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
277. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1186-87.
278. Id. at 1187. This point was sharply contested by the dissent. See id. at 1199
(Cantero, J., dissenting) (“[T]he failure to maintain an installed streetlight does not create
a greater risk than that created by the absence of a streetlight. It simply reverts the circumstances to the status quo ante—darkness.”). Indeed, the majority creates an interesting
paradigm where a utility is under no duty in the first to install street lighting, but once
street lighting is provided, the utility must be vigilant to ensure its continued proper functioning. See id. at 1186-87. The majority does not cite any authority for its distinction between negligent maintenance and negligent installation. See id. at 1187-88. Further, a
governmental entity may, in its discretion, decide to conserve resources by not lighting all
streetlights at all times and may still avoid a negligence claim. Id. at 1188. The difference—a conscious decision either not to supply lighting at all or not to supply lighting at a
particular time, versus not supplying lighting involuntarily due to negligent maintenance—is difficult to see.
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As a second predicate for duty, the court also indicated that Clay
Electric induced reliance on the part of the plaintiffs by undertaking
to provide street lighting.279 Reasoning that Johnson’s grandmother
arguably only allowed Johnson to walk in the early-morning darkness because of her belief that the streets were lighted, the court
stated that this reliance was a possible separate, second basis to imply a duty to the plaintiffs.280
In a concurring opinion, Justice Pariente opined that Clay Electric’s agreement to maintain the streetlights also created an additional basis for a common law tort duty.281 Relying on a pair of Florida cases for the proposition that a contractual duty to provide a service may create a duty to the public, Justice Pariente reasoned that
Clay Electric’s contract extended the foreseeable zone of risk and implied a duty upon Clay Electric.282 Additionally, the concurring opinion emphasized that the court’s imposition of duty was not a determination of Clay Electric’s liability, but rather, a shift in the focus of
the inquiry to the jury to find whether Clay Electric was negligent,
and if so, whether the negligence was the legal cause of Johnson’s
death.283
In addition to the concerns discussed above,284 the dissent, in an
opinion authored by Justice Cantero and joined by Justice Wells, offered a number of public policy reasons why the court should not imply a duty to the public upon companies that have agreed to maintain streetlights. These include: risks for nighttime automobile accidents are best borne by automobile insurance companies rather than
streetlight maintenance companies, the costs of maintaining street279. Id.
280. Id. Record testimony did not indicate such reliance had occurred; further, evidence at trial showed that the streetlights were inoperative for some time. See id. at 1200
(Cantero, J., dissenting) (citing testimony that the streetlights had “never worked” and because reliance was not alleged at trial, inference of reliance by the majority was inappropriate).
281. Id. at 1192 (Pariente, J., concurring).
282. Id. (citing Mugge v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 42 So. 81 (1906), and Woodbury v.
Tampa Waterworks Co., 49 So. 556 (1909)). The dissent cited Mugge and Woodbury for the
opposite proposition—when an entity contracts with a government, the contract itself determines the scope of the entity’s duty to the public, and in the cases of Mugge and Woodbury, the utilities had contractually assumed a duty to the public. See id. at 1201-02
(Cantero, J., dissenting); see also Arenado v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628, 629
(Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (stating the duty to the public assumed by the utilities in Mugge and
Woodbury was predicated upon the terms of the contract).
283. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1193-95 (Pariente, J., concurring).
284. These include: the majority places Florida in the slim minority of jurisdictions
that have considered negligent streetlight maintenance and overlooks seventy-five years of
precedent, relying upon the logic of H.R. Moch, whereby utilities have no duty to the public
for the denial of a benefit, supra note 273 and accompanying text; when a utility enters a
contract with a governmental entity, that contract determines the scope and existence, if
any, of the utility’s duty to the public, supra note 282 and accompanying text; the majority
misinterprets the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A, supra notes 278, 280 and accompanying text.
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lights exceeds the value conferred by such maintenance, and the excessive maintenance costs will ultimately pass to the consumer.285
The majority’s holding guarantees a class of plaintiffs—those aggrieved by a malfunctioning streetlight, as well as possibly a broader
class encompassing any recipient of a benefit of a public government
contract—a trial on the merits of a negligence claim.286 This is consistent with the role of duty in a negligence claim argued for by some
commentators; that is, a court should not dismiss a negligence claim
for “no duty” lightly, especially if a claim could turn on particular
facts.287 To get to this result, the court distinguished the precedent of
H.R. Moch,288 even though all Florida courts that had considered the
scenario prior to Johnson’s claim had followed H.R. Moch.289 Further,
though the majority dismisses the dissent’s articulated policy concerns as speculative,290 the dissent’s concerns are not illogical. The
majority creates a state of the law where a utility has no duty to install lighting, but once lighting is installed and the utility agrees to
maintain the lights, the utility cannot easily dismiss claims for negligent maintenance against them.291 Florida utilities are not free to increase the rates they charge to compensate for the increased costliness of litigation following Clay Electric, unless the Public Service
Commission (PSC) approves the increase.292 It does not take a logical
leap to foresee utilities halting entering the streetlight maintenance

285. Clay Elec., at 1203-04 (Cantero, J., dissenting). The majority dismissed the dissent’s policy concerns as “speculation” and for the legislature to consider, rather than the
courts. Id. at 1189-90.
286. One of the concerns regarding the proposed legislation to overturn Clay Electric,
discussed infra notes 297-02, was that the bill would violate the provision of the Florida
Constitution guaranteeing access to the courts. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, HB
1573 (2004) Staff Analysis 5 (Mar. 26, 2004) (on file with comm.), http://www.flsenate.gov/
data/session/2004/House/bills/analysis/pdf/h1573.ju.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
287. See DOBBS, supra note 260, § 227.
288. See Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1188-89. The significance of H.R. Moch is discussed
supra note 273.
289. See, e.g., Batista v. City of Miami, 780 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) 873 So.
2d at 1182, Arenado v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988),
overruled by overruled by Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1188.
290. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1189.
291. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
292. See FLA. STAT. § 366.06(1) (2003) (“A public utility shall not . . . charge or receive
any rate not on file with the commission for the particular class of service involved . . . .
[T]he commission shall have the authority to determine and fix . . . reasonable rates that
may be requested, demanded, charged, or collected by any public utility for its service.”).
Alternatively, if the PSC allows utilities to charge higher rates due to the increased financial risk in streetlight maintenance following Clay Electric, the dissent’s fears of passing on
to consumers the ultimate cost of liability will be realized. See Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at
1204 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is the ratepayers who will bear the brunt through
higher rate structures.”).

2004]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

313

business altogether—rather than promote non-negligent action, the
opinion provides an incentive to not provide streetlights at all.293
The Clay Electric opinion has already had nonspeculative effects—it has precipitated action in the lower appellate courts as well
as the Florida Legislature. The Fourth District Court of Appeal applied the new precedent of Clay Electric to reverse a trial court summary judgment. In Dolan v. Florida Power & Light Co.,294 a trial
court had granted summary judgment for the defendant utility in a
wrongful death action. David Dolan was killed in a motorcycle accident allegedly caused by a negligently maintained overhead streetlight.295 Consistent with Clay Electric, the Fourth District overturned
the summary judgment and remanded the action for trial.296
The Clay Electric opinion also sparked an attempt by the 2004
Legislature to overrule the opinion. Under House Bill 1573, no entity
responsible for providing or maintaining a streetlight “owes a duty to
the public to provide, operate, or maintain the illumination in any
manner, except that such a duty may be expressly assumed by written contract.”297 Additionally, the bill provided that neither the state,
its officers, agencies, and instrumentalities, nor electric utilities, that
maintain streetlights would be liable for civil damages for injury or
death caused by inadequate or failed illumination.298 House Bill 1573
was approved by a 90-25 vote; however, its Senate counterpart died
in committee.299 After the legislation seeking to overturn Clay Electric failed, it bodes to be an interesting year with regard to how utilities react to minimize the risk of litigation under Clay Electric.

293. See Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1205 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur streets will not
become safer. Rather, municipalities and utilities will ponder carefully before installing
any new streetlights, . . . as it will only increase their potential liability.”). Further, the dissent does not address the impact of Clay Electric upon existing streetlight maintenance
contracts. Clay Electric may foreshadow the nonrenewal or termination of these agreements if streetlight maintenance is not sufficiently profitable in the face of the nowheightened prospect of liability. For example, Florida Power & Light Co. (FPL), a Florida
investor-owned utility regulated by the PSC, is allowed to charge from $1.36 to $3.47 per
month for maintenance of FPL-owned streetlights, which is included in the total rate for a
streetlight ranging from $5.51 to $20.97, depending upon the type of light. FPL Co., Street
Lighting, Tariff Sheet No. 8.716 (Mar. 7, 2003), http://www.fpl.com/about/rates/pdf/
electric_tariff_section8.pdf. It is possible that utilities will view streetlights as a poor investment compared to the risk of costly litigation and not renew maintenance agreements,
forcing either local governments to pay for street light maintenance or the streetlights to
fall into disuse.
294. 872 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
295. Id. at 275.
296. Id. at 276.
297. Fla. HB 1573, § 1 (2004) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 768.1382).
298. Id.
299. FLA. LEGIS., WEEKLY LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 2004 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 112, HB 1537.

